Nicholson added that his unit, whose role was to advise and assist
Afghan forces without engaging in combat, asked three times for
commanders to clarify the rules governing their mission.
Amid fierce fighting after the
Taliban captured the northern Afghan city of Kunduz last year, U.S.
special forces advisers repeatedly asked their commanders how far they
were allowed to go to help local troops retake the city.
They
got no answer, according to witnesses interviewed in a recently
declassified, heavily redacted Pentagon report that lays bare the
confusion over rules of engagement governing the mission in Afghanistan.
As
the Taliban insurgency gathers strength, avoiding enemy fire has become
increasingly difficult for advisers, who have been acting as
consultants rather than combatants since NATO forces formally ceased
fighting at the end of 2014.
In the heat of the
battle, lines can be blurred, and the problem is not exclusive to
Afghanistan: questions have arisen over the role of U.S. troops in Iraq
after a U.S. Navy SEAL was killed by Islamic State this month.
"'How far do you want to go?' is not a proper response to 'How far do you want us to go?'"
one special forces member told investigators in a report into the U.S.
air strikes on a hospital in Kunduz that killed 42 medical staff,
patients and caretakers.
That incident was the
biggest single tragedy of the brief capitulation of Kunduz to Taliban
militants, and there is no suggestion that the mistake was the result of
a lack of clarity over the rules of engagement.
But
the 700-page report, much of it blacked out for security reasons, sheds
light on how the rules are not fully understood, even by some troops on
the ground, compromising the mission to stabilise the nation and defeat
a worsening Islamist insurgency.
The issues exposed in the report are likely to be considered by the new U.S. commander in Afghanistan, General John Nicholson, as
he prepares to makes recommendations in the coming weeks that may
clarify or expand the level of combat support the U.S.-led training
mission can provide.
"It's not a strategy and, in fact, it's a recipe for disaster in that kind of kinetic environment," said the soldier, who, like others in the report, was not identified.
He
added that his unit, whose role was to advise and assist Afghan forces
without engaging in combat, asked three times for commanders to clarify
the rules governing their mission.
"Sadly, the only sounds audible were the sounds of crickets ... though those were hard to hear over the gunfire."
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